

**IN THE MAHARASHTRA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL  
MUMBAI BENCH**

**ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO 508 OF 2020**

**DISTRICT : SOLAPUR**

Shri Vicky Subhash Gaikwad,            )  
Working as Police Naik,                )  
R/o Black No. 6, Room No. 4,         )  
Ashok Chowk, Police Headquarters, )  
Solapur City, Solapur 413 005.        )**...Applicant**

**Versus**

1.    The State of Maharashtra         )  
      Through the Addl. Chief         )  
      Secretary, Home Department, )  
      Mantralaya, Mumbai 400 032.)
2.    The Director General of Police,)  
      M.S, Mumbai,                    )  
      Shahid Bhagat Singh Marg,     )  
      Colaba, Mumbai 400 001.        )
3.    The Commissioner of Police,    )  
      Solapur City,                    )  
      Police Commissioner office,     )  
      Hotagi Road, Gandhi Nagar,     )  
      Keshav Nagar, Solapur 413 003)**...Respondents**

Shri Kunal Tilak, learned advocate for the Applicant.

Ms Swati Manchekar, learned Chief Presenting Officer for the Respondents.

**CORAM** : **Justice Mridula Bhatkar (Chairperson)**  
**Shri Debashish Chakrabarty (Member)(A)**

**DATE** : **01.09.2023**

**PER** : **Shri Debashish Chakrabarty (Member)(A)**

### **J U D G M E N T**

1. The Applicant prays that this Tribunal be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 2.9.2020 of Dismissal from Service passed by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority by invoking powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and to reinstate the Applicant forthwith with along with all the consequential Service Benefits.

2. Learned Counsel has stated that the Applicant who was working as Police Naik at the relevant time was suspended by order dated 14.8.2020 by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority on the alleged charges that Applicant has encouraged Illegal Sand Transportation and Misbehavior with Superior Officers thus had abused his position as Police Naik. Learned Counsel submitted that FIR No 818/2020 & FIR No. 819/2020 was registered against the Applicant under Section 379 r/w 34 of IPC. Learned Counsel has further submitted that the Applicant was suspended on 14.8.2020 in contemplation of Departmental Enquiry. However, no Department Enquiry was held against the Applicant. On the contrary the Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority issued order of Dismissal from Service on 2.9.2020, by invoking the powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel has submitted that while invoking the powers under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, it is

necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to state the reasons specifically as to why it was not reasonably practicable to conduct the Departmental Enquiry. Learned Counsel took us through the contents of the impugned order dated 2.9.2020, of Respondent No. 3 as Disciplinary Authority. Learned Counsel submitted that in the entire order dated 2.9.2020, no reason is given as to why it was not reasonably practicable to conduct the Departmental Enquiry. Learned Counsel further submitted that it was the right of the Applicant to be heard and to have audience for the misconduct or any act for which he is charged by Respondent No. 3 as Disciplinary Authority. The Departmental Enquiry is to be done based on principles of Natural Justice and hence it was breached by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority. Learned Counsel has also submitted that on the date on which the order of 'Dismissal from Service' was passed by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority, no specific charges were framed. The Charge Sheet has not been filed against the Applicant in FIR No. 818/2020 and FIR No 819/2020. Hence, the stand taken by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority that no notice could be served on the applicants is false and incorrect. Learned Counsel for the Applicant further submitted that his order of Dismissal from Service by impugned order dated 2.9.2020 passed by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority is illegal and violative of the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India deserves to be set aside and the Applicant should be reinstated in service with all consequential Service Benefits.

3. Learned counsel for the Applicant has relied on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

- (i) Union of India & Anr. Vs. Tulsiram Patel & Anr, AIR 1985 SC 1416.

- (ii) Tarsem Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors, (2006) 13 SCC 581.
- (iii) Risal Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors (2014) 13 SCC 244.

4. Learned C.P.O while opposing the Original Application defended the order passed on 2.9.2020 by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority by invoking powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. Learned C.P.O relied on the Affidavit in Reply dated 22.12.2020 filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3 as Disciplinary Authority. Learned C.P.O submitted that Preliminary Enquiry was conducted against the Applicant and taking into consideration the involvement of the Applicant in Illegal Sand Transportation for which offences were registered against him in FIR 818/2020 & 819/2020 and there were also incidents of Applicant's Misbehavior with Superior Officer. The Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority has rightly arrived at the conclusion with subjective satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct the Departmental Enquiry and accordingly orders were passed against the Applicant for Dismissal from Service on 2.9.2020 by invoking powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. Learned C.P.O has submitted that the personnel of Police Force are protectors of law and it was their duty to ensure Law and Order is maintained and there is prevention of Illegal Activities and Crime in Society. Learned C.P.O further submitted that the conduct of the Applicant therefor was of very serious nature and immediate stringent action was necessary to curb such tendencies amongst personnel of Police Force and in order to preserve faith of general public in the Police Force. Thus, the Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority has rightly arrived at the conclusion with subjective satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to conduct the Departmental Enquiry and accordingly Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority was justified in passing the order dated 2.9.2020, for Dismissal from

Service of the Applicant by invoking powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.

5. Learned C.P.O in support of the above contentions, relied on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.

- (i) Satyavir Singh & Ors Vs. Union of India & Ors, (1985) 4 SCC 252.
- (ii) Ved Mitter Gill Vs. Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh & Ors, (2015) 8 SCC 86.

6. Considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Applicants and the learned C.P.O. Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India is reproduced below:-

Article 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.—.....

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:

Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed:

Provided further that this clause shall not apply:—

(a) Where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or

(b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or

(c) Where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.”

7. On the point of Summary Removal from service without conducting Departmental Enquiry, the law is laid down in the case of **Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 and Satyavir Singh (1985) 4 SCC 252 (supra)**. In both the Judgments, it was held that to conduct of Departmental Enquiry is a rule and Summary Dismissal or Removal from Service was an exception. The provision of Article 311(2)(b) specifies the exceptional circumstances as “reasonably not practicable to conduct the departmental enquiry”. In both the judgments it is held that it is a matter of subjective satisfaction, but it should be based on objective material. Thus, such exceptional circumstances preventing the Disciplinary Authority from conducting the Departmental Enquiry should be reflected in the order passed under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. After going through the impugned order passed on 2.9.2020 by Respondent No. 3 against the Applicants as we find that the reason given for not conducting the Departmental Enquiry as stated by learned C.P.O that the applicants were charged with offences under Section 379 r/w 34 of I.P.C and suspended on 14.8.2020, and therefore it was not possible to give them notice to conduct the Departmental Enquiry and allowing the Applicant to work in Police Force would severely damage the Public Image of the Police Force as the applicants had been rudely published in the Social Media and Newspapers.

8. It is necessary to reproduce the ratio and the guiding principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **TULSIRAM PATEL's case (supra)**.

*“130.....It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry where the government servant, particularly through or together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or intimidate witnesses who are going to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent them from doing so or where the government servant by himself or together with or through other threatens, intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary authority or member of his family so that he is afraid to hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether the concerned government servant is or is not a party to bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause(3) of [Article 311](#) makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by [Article 311\(3\)](#) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty.”*

*“133. The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by [Article 311\(2\)](#). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.”*

9. In the case of **Ved Mitter Gill (supra)**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

*"23. The first ingredient, which is a prerequisite to the sustainable application of the above clause (b) is, that the delinquency alleged should be such as would justify, any one of the three punishments, namely, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank.*

*26. The second ingredient which needs to be met, for a valid exercise of clause (b) to the second proviso under [Article 311\(2\)](#) of the Constitution of India, is the satisfaction of the competent authority, that it was not reasonably practicable, to hold a regular departmental enquiry, against the employees concerned. On the question whether it was reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, the competent authority has recorded its conclusion in the paragraphs, preceding the one depicting the involvement of the appellant/petitioners.*

*28. The third essential ingredient, for a valid application of clause (b) to the second proviso under [Article 311\(2\)](#) of the Constitution of India, is that, the competent authority must record, the reasons of the above satisfaction in writing."*

10. In the case of **Satyavir Singh & Ors (supra)**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

*"(55) There are two conditions precedent which must be satisfied before clause (b) of the second proviso to [Article 311 \(2\)](#) can be applied. These conditions are:*

*(i) there must exist a situation which makes the holding of an inquiry contemplated by [Article 311 \(2\)](#) not reasonably practicable, and*

*(ii) the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry.*

*(60) The disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the civil servant is weak and must fail.*



*(70) The contention that where an inquiry into the charges against a civil servant is not reasonably practicable, none the less before dispensing with the inquiry there should be a preliminary inquiry into the question whether the disciplinary inquiry should be dispensed with or not is illogical and is a contradiction in terms. If an inquiry into the charges against a civil servant is not reasonable practicable, it stands to reason that an inquiry into the question whether the disciplinary inquiry should be dispensed with or not is equally not reasonably practicable.”*

11. In the case of **RISAL SINGH (supra)**, the delinquent was also from Police Department was prosecuted and dismissed on account of corruption charges. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

*“9. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid authorities, the irresistible conclusion is that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police dispensing with the inquiry is totally unsustainable and is hereby annulled. As the foundation founders, the order of the High Court giving the stamp of approval to the ultimate order without addressing the lis from a proper perspective is also indefensible and resultantly, the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority has to pave the path of extinction.*

*10. Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and that of the disciplinary authority. The appellant shall be deemed to be in service till the date of superannuation. As he has attained the age of superannuation in the meantime, he shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. The arrears shall be computed and paid to the appellant within a period of three months hence. Needless to say, the respondents are not precluded from initiating any disciplinary proceedings, if advised in law. As the lis has been pending before the Court, the period that has been spent in Court shall be excluded for the purpose of limitation for initiating the disciplinary proceedings as per rules. However, we may hasten to clarify that our observations herein should not be construed as a mandate to the authorities to initiate the proceeding against the appellant. We may further proceed to add that the State Government shall conduct itself as a model employer and act with the objectivity which is expected from it.”*

12. In the case of **TARSEM SINGH (supra)**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

*“14. In view of the fact that no material had been placed by the respondents herein to satisfy the Court that it was necessary to dispense with a formal enquiry in terms of proviso (b) appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and they are set aside accordingly. The appellant is directed to be reinstated in service. However, in view of our aforementioned findings, it would be open to the respondents to initiate a departmental enquiry against the appellant if they so desire. Payment of back wages shall abide by the result of such enquiry. Such an enquiry, if any, must be initiated as expeditiously as possible and not later than two months from the date of communication of this order.”*

13. We are of the considered view that the Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority had failed to disclose in the order dated 2.9.2020 for Dismissal from Service of the Applicant as what were the specific reasons to conclude that it was not Reasonably Practicable to conduct the Departmental Enquiry against the Applicant as was mandatorily required to be recorded by him in writing under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.

14. In view of the above, the following order is passed:-

### **ORDER**

(i) The order dated 2.9.2020 of Removal from Service passed against the Applicant by Respondent No. 3, as Disciplinary Authority invoking powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India is hereby quashed and set aside with directions to reinstate the Applicant in service within a period of One Month.

(ii) The Respondent No. 3 as Disciplinary Authority will be at liberty to initiate Departmental Enquiry against the Applicant if so desired but it must be initiated as expeditiously as possible from the date of communication of this order and in any case within Two Months.

(iii) The amount of the Pay and Allowances to which the Applicant would have been entitled to had he not been subjected to order of Dismissal from Service on 2.9.2020 under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, be determined as per provisions of Rule 71(2)(a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Service and Payments during Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules, 1981.

**Sd/-**

**(Debashish Chakrabarty)  
Member (A)**

**Sd/-**

**(Mridula Bhatkar, J.)  
Chairperson**

**Place : Mumbai  
Date : 01.09.2023  
Dictation taken by : A.K. Nair.**